1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan,
661 every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutasarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daf-
[623] tardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of
625 elected members who included Christian and Jewish representatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi-
631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.
647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiya--Analyst]

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If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

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openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

## 2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

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for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intrusion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Bequests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Ḥilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



factory) impressed even foreign critics as well-managed; formal parades and regimental bands improved morale; and Nadhim Pasha's policy of concentrating his forces was retained in some measure by his successors. A state of feud between the Wali and the General was in each wilaya more usual than one of collaboration, and was curable only when the two posts were combined. In army as in civil administration, the fundamental disease was the abiding poverty which, for economy, must needs acquiesce in depleted strengths and reserveless depots, leave pay in arrears, and force the troops often to live on the countryside—or to desert.

The Ḥamidiya regiments, recruited in 'Iraq only in the extreme north, ceased to exist after 1909; but 'frontier companies' designed to give military employment to Kurdish tribesmen of the Shahrizur and Sulaymaniya sanjaqs were formed in 1912 with a more military and less patriarchal complexion. A greater reorganization was that which in 1911, on the advice of von der Goltz Pasha, created the 4th Inspectorate, to cover the whole of 'Iraq and south-western Arabia with two Corps, the 12th and 13th, at Mosul and Baghdad respectively and one, the 14th, in the Yaman. The Reserve system was unchanged until, after a complete breakdown, it was revised, all too late, in 1914. The Navy at Baṣra remained decayed and futile. The gunboat *Zohab*, acquired in 1902, was in 1911 captured by the Italians in the Red Sea. *Kilid al-Baḥr* remained afloat. The *Marmaris* arrived at Baṣra in 1908.

Among improvements in communications made during this period the greater use of wheeled traffic, notably on the upper Euphrates routes and those radiating from Baghdad, called for a modest measure of road-making. A Zab bridge was completed, not without grave scandal. The telegraph service was extended to most of the small towns, including those of the Kurdish qadhās. The use of telephones began to be extended in Baghdad to the beginnings of a public service, and in 1914 there was talk of a Baghdad–Baṣra wireless service. The 'Aniza-borne trans-desert postal service, diverted in 1906 from a Damascus to an Aleppo terminal, was twice robbed by Dulaym in 1909 and was suspended in 1912. The Tatar service by Mosul to Istanbul was maintained until the outbreak of war. Offers were twice made of a motor-carried post to Syria: once, optimistically, by Ḥamdi Bey Baban in 1911, and once by a French group in 1914. Adoption of either proposal would have involved major road improvement and called for a standard of mechanical reliability unlikely to be achieved.

Of the succession of well-remembered high Turkish officials of this period, scores of personal anecdotes are still told in 'Iraq today. All suffered from the growing penetration of Turkish administration by party politics after 1908, as they had from

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capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 191[illegible]: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

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and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

### 3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



# VI

# TO INDEPENDENCE

## 1. TREATY DEADLOCK

THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



economy by the world crisis of 1929–31, nor halt the steady diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they correct those unfavourable, indeed menacing, features of 'Iraq public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived Cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative Parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment.

The 'Iraq Parliament in its first ordinary session had, indeed, all the appearance of a sober and reasonable body. It dealt with nearly seventy bills, and carried out its procedure with correctness. The second session, opened on 1 November 1926, was less fortunate. Political and personal faction grew more bitter. Naji al-Suwaydi's 'People's Party', founded in August 1924, was still active, though it ceased to exist in 1927; that of National Independence, the creation of a Mosul notable, 'Abdullah al-'Umari, had already died in 1925. 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey's Progressives, founded in 1925, were dominant in moderate circles until his death, and the Popular Party (Ḥizb al-Sha'b) of Yasin Pasha flourished from late in 1925 until 1928. The Nationalist Party of Ja'far Abu al-Timman, suppressed almost at birth in 1922, revived in 1926 and continued vigorous until 1933. These, to which the Party of Awakening—Ḥizb al-Nahdha—was shortly to be added in its revived form, did nothing to tranquillize the political scene.

The second Sa'dun Ministry fell on the first day of the new Parliament, when its candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, then 'Iraqi Minister in London and a Progressive, was summoned home and three weeks later, on 21 November, formed a Coalition Ministry which included Yasin Pasha at Finance, Rashid 'Ali Gaylani at Interior, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi in Justice, General Nuri Sa'id in Defence, the Basra aristocrat Amin 'Ali Basha'yan at Awqaf, Muḥammad Amin Zaki in Communications and Works, and two Shi'is, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi and 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi, at Education and the new Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture created in August 1927. This second and last ministry of Ja'far Pasha covered the year 1927. It was marked by useful legislative work, but constantly endangered by the ill discipline of the parties both in their internal factions and as between their heads and the Cabinet to which, with too little loyalty, they belonged.

The year had three features of especial political interest. The first of these was a revival, not unannounced by previous indications, of the Shi'i element as a political force. With the removal of Turkish discouragements to Shi'i emergence, and of their obscurantist leadership by the 'Ulamā whose highest effectiveness had

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(from the present writer), of Income Tax (from Sainsbury), of Public Works (from Clay); these were to be closely followed by that of Irrigation (from Allard) in 1933, of Tapu (from Alderman, who died) in 1934, and of Antiquities in 1934. Progress towards raising the standard for officials, the object of successive boards, commissions, and examinations, was fluctuating; the work of one minister in re-selecting and purifying the personnel was undone by the next, and was rarely free from personal factors. In the task of fixing establishments and regulations, as in all Government activities, the discontinuity of frequently changed Cabinets was an obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, a fair standard was achieved in a body of officials no longer exclusively ex-Turkish veterans, no longer alien, and far superior to anything seen in Ottoman times for honesty, goodwill, and energy. Corruption if not unknown was rarely scandalous and, as never before, sincerely condemned.

The Courts continued, not without an occasional scandal, to earn general respect. The standard of the judiciary was respectable and some 'Iraqi jurists were of high merit. With accessibility, recourse to the Courts grew commoner: 13,000 Peace Court cases were heard in 1919, 63,000 in 1929. Seventy-three advocates were licensed to practise in the former of these years, 165 in the latter.

New administrative units—qadhās and nahiyas—were formed by regrading and subdividing as need occurred; examples were common in Kurdistan, and in the Southern Desert Province formed in 1928 for better frontier control. New groupings among the departments in Baghdad led to changes of ministerial function and nomenclature; but the object of these—the better handling of projects of development—and indeed administrative progress in every field, was for the time partly frustrated by the economic depression of the years 1929 to 1932.

The years of penury and near-crisis preceding the entry of 'Iraq into the League called for wise and firm financial management. The general fall in prices of agricultural products led to a severe drop in land revenue, which the fall in Customs and other receipts aggravated. At the same time essential expenditure did not decrease, and the campaigns in Kurdistan made exceptional demands. The slump and its social effects would have been more severe had 'Iraq been an exporter of manufactured goods; instead, her raw products continued in some demand at lower prices, and it was possible at least to maintain the standards of the public services, and to help distressed pump-cultivators to survive. The State's finances were, under prudent advice, well handled, with careful budgeting, strict accountancy, and measures of economy which demanded some political courage. Vernon left the Adviser-ship to the Ministry in 1928, succeeded for three years by Swan as

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*645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

*645 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Ali, in the pre-
• 661 sence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Ali began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Hikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Haydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muhammad Zaki al-Basri, in Justice.

*645 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national co-
668 operation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

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645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of
648x Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

x 645 Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long
665 exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring
[661] use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

665 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power
668 than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



665 668 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Āli and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Āli led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

[656 661]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemployment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active operations could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq M81



with the promise of full freedom of choice. But his hopes of securing a strong Chamber and satisfied parties by inviting their co-operation were but partially gratified; the Liberals and National Democrats, invited to name representatives for Cabinet posts, did so in the persons of 'Ali Mumtaz at the Ministry of Works and Muḥammad Ḥadid at that of Supply; but both these and two Shi'i ministers, Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Education, resigned their offices in the following month to devote themselves to an election campaign. Most of the parties, including Ṣaliḥ Jabr's parliamentary Political Bloc, took part and one, the unauthorized National Liberation Party, was the cause of a scuffle with the police at Kadhimiya. The Cabinet was, with consequent changes, reformed to include 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi at Works, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh at Supply and temporarily at Finance, Shakir al-Wadi (reputed to be in the close confidence of the Regent) at Defence, Babā 'Ali at Economics, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab at Social Affairs and for a time at Education, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, and 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice.

The conduct of the elections, which began in February, did not prevent Nuri Pasha from locating hotbeds of Communism and claiming by his arrests and searches to have suppressed them. The followers of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh were involved, and from these or other groups such leaders as Ibrahim Naji Shummal, Zaki Muḥammad Baṣim, and two score of their associates were arrested. With the exposure of the Communist cells in every liwā, the Premier could hope that a fatal blow had been dealt to the movement; but gratitude for this did little to diminish the fury of press attacks on himself and on targets provided by the British, notably Reuter's Agency and local branches of the British Council.

The Chamber of Deputies which, amid the usual outcries against 'Government interference', emerged from the elections, showed a large majority of independent members or supporters of Nuri and of Ṣaliḥ Jabr. The National Democratic Party secured five seats, the other parties none. When Parliament opened Nuri, who had accepted the premiership on this understanding, now made way for Ṣaliḥ Jabr, and was ready to support a Ministry led by him—the first to be formed under a Shi'i Premier. Ṣaliḥ reserved for himself the Ministry of the Interior and relied upon experienced colleagues in the other appointments: he retained Jamali, Shakir al-Wadi, 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh, and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab in their former posts, and brought Jamal Baban to Justice and temporarily to Economics, Ghanima to Finance, the Kurdish scholar Tawfiq Wahbi to Education, the Shi'i Dhiyā' Ja'far—a Birmingham graduate in oil engineering—to Works. The Opposition, itself fragmentary, was formed mainly by the five parties not represented

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



the Prime Minister and the Regent both visited London during the year. The objectives of all politicians (save only the vehement minority who would break every form of British connexion) were the removal of all limitation to their independence and free choice, the end of all treatment of the country as a junior partner, and the abolition of provisions which, offensively to their *amour propre*, left Habbaniya and Shu'ayba as British cantonments in the heart of 'Iraq. The early negotiations with the British Ambassador appeared to run smoothly, and the Ministry could hope that early 1948 would see a happy solution. Newspaper attacks on Great Britain, unhelpful in these circumstances, were as ever the commonplace of every journalist, and were suspended only in part and temporarily in the summer of 1947, when a party of 'Iraqi editors visited London.

In the two years following the armistice most of the remaining British officials of the Administration—a tiny remnant of the body so active and so hopeful in 1919–20—left 'Iraq. Edmonds had retired in 1945, succeeded in Interior by A. H. Ditchburn. In 1946 Drower of Justice, Sinderson of the Medical Services, Atkinson of Irrigation, Caparn of Communications and Works, H. I. Lloyd of the Date Board, and Grice of Interior were among the losses sustained by the Government. They were followed next year by Swan of Finance, Seton Lloyd of Antiquities, and Chadwick of the Veterinary Department.

It was regrettable that Salih Jabr's best-meaning of Governments was compelled, like its predecessors, to take steps against press and party agitation which passed all reasonable limits. Its Palestine policy was more than correct, its moves towards Treaty revision active and popular; but this was not enough. Exclusion from power and sheer hatred of the 'old gang'—and of the British allegedly behind them—still led the parties to frenzies of anti-Government zeal. A newspaper was suppressed in April, and two more in June. Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim were charged with sedition. The premises of the People's Party were seized and 'Aziz Sharif arrested, but released. Trials of Communists detained under the last Sa'idi Ministry, some months ago, led to a score of long sentences of imprisonment and to death sentences[1] on Yusif Salman, Zaki Basim, and Naji Shummal for inciting troops and police against the State; these were later commuted to long terms of imprisonment. Baghdad bookshops were raided and the premises of the more extreme parties searched.

[1] The *Daily Worker*'s later (17 February 1949) description of the 'Iraq Government was that of a 'corrupt and murderous puppet of British imperialism'; *L'Humanité* (8 February 1949) attributed 'Iraq's anti-Communist steps to 'the Anglo-American millionaires who are preparing war'.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Dhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1



668 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid
661 the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

648 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI



646 where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as else-
666 where, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

646 The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to con-
● 661 sider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

646 Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925
661 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the
656 deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI



revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its complete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shi'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.
[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.
[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH1 Iraq MH1



one hand, to recognition of the long existing necessity of lightening the burdens on agricultural produce, and, on the other, to the fall in world prices. The former argument might be more effective if the principal benefit of the reduction of land-revenue had been widespread and not restricted thus far to the comparatively few large landowners. The fall in world prices did no doubt cause a tremendous decrease in land-revenue but the decrease has been out of all proportion to the fall in prices. It must be observed also that no proportionate decrease occurred in the animal head-tax although the price of animals fell as sharply in 1930 as that of agricultural produce. Thus, while *kods* produced 5.2 per cent of the total receipts in 1921, it produced 7 per cent in 1928 and 6.2 per cent in 1931. The comparatively steady returns are hardly explained by increasing efficiency in collections and by increase in flocks but rather by the fact that most of the animals were owned by tribes whose voices counted for little in official circles.

Less tangible evidence seems to exist for the success of the attempts to eradicate corruption from revenue assessment and collection and from financial administration than for any other aspect of administrative activity, although every British official in the Ministry of Finance has striven for that end. The existence of dishonesty and of jobbery for financial favours, which seems to have increased from 1929-30 onwards, has been one of the most unsatisfactory features of administrative life, as most 'Iraqis admit. The tendency has been to lay the blame upon Turkish ex-officials and upon practices inherited from Turkish days, but the evil seems to be too prevalent to be thus accounted for. The true explanation seems to lie in the fact that public spirit has not yet been able to rise above the natural desire to avoid taxation, no less strong in 'Iraq than in other countries. The attitude of Parliament to personal aggrandisement at the expense of national interests has already been indicated. Even Ministers have been known to take advantage

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH1 Iraq MH1



661 of their position for their personal profit.[1] Lesser officials have too often followed the example of their superiors. Attempts have been made to impose checks, as by the auditing of government accounts by a British Comptroller and Auditor General responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. This official has performed his task ably and efficiently,[2] but the results of his work have not been as extensive as might have been expected, due to the reluctance of Parliament to take action, particularly against highly placed or influential officials.

*Justice*

Two distinct tasks have fallen to the Minister of Justice in 'Iraq: the organization and the administrative supervision of the courts and the drafting and codifying of legislation not only for the assurance of public justice but also for the regulation and development of other administrative services.

692 In the period 1925 to 1932, the number of Civil Courts was extended until they were in operation in varying degrees at forty-eight centres. Criminal Justice continued to be administered by the Civil Judges of these courts and also, in certain cases, by Administrative Inspectors and other senior officials. *Shara'* or Muslim Religious Law Courts continued to be established, not only in all centres where Civil Courts were provided but also in other places. Spiritual Courts to enable the Jewish and Christian communities to deal with their own religious law were set up in 1931,[3] in accordance with Articles 78-80 and 112 of the Constitution.

In the creation and administration of the *Shara'* Courts, including those established for the Shī'a sect, a tendency has been noticed to assimilate them with the Civil Courts in order

[1] An outstanding instance has been the passage of legislation, remitting revenue on lands irrigated by pumps, by a Minister of Finance, who, as one of the largest owners of such lands, saved himself £3000 in taxes annually.

[2] *Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Accounts of the Government of 'Iraq*: 1922 . . . (Baghdad, 1924 . . . ).

[3] *Compilation*, 1931, Armenian Orthodox Community Law, No. 70 of 1931: Jewish Community Law, No. 77 of 1931.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1



654* 647 irrigation works among agricultural officials in the Ministry of Economics, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Public Works and health officials in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The efficiency of civil servants seems to have declined since before the war. Certainly the increase in the number of government employees (excluding police) from about 11,000 before the war to almost 20,000 in 1950 has been considerably out of proportion to the expansion in the government's functions. Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. The morale among government servants is generally low.

647 465 The two most important factors contributing to inefficiency and morale are probably the low level of government salaries and the lack of any sense of real participation in constructive work. Since before the war salaries and allowances have risen only 20 percent for high government officials and 160 percent for the lowest paid officials, while the official cost-of-living index has increased by about 400 percent. To some extent, however, there has been an increase in salaries through shifts to higher grades, so that, judging from comparative total disbursements of salaries and allowances, it may be concluded that average salaries have risen by about 130 percent since before the war.[7] Nevertheless, salaries, particularly of officials in the higher classes of the civil service, are very [461] inadequate. The probity of officials is thus put to a severe test and to the extent that some successfully utilize their positions as opportunities for personal gain, the morale of others suffers. Moreover, many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.

654* 647 The lack of a real sense of participation in constructive tasks is conspicuous in the civil service. The Mission found a wide-

[7] Total disbursements of ID 14,700,000 on salaries and allowances in 1949-50 compared with a sum of about ID 3,500,000 before the war.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1



along the banks of main and secondary canals although roads greatly facilitate inspection and maintenance. The facing of the canals adjoining the control structures is often too short for effective protection of both the canals and the control works. The turbulent water coming up against the earthen embankments may then undermine the embankments or even the control structures themselves. Brick, which lacks adequate resistance to shock and erosion, has sometimes been used as a construction material where concrete or precast concrete blocks would have been definitely preferable. In the future, it might also be desirable to try gabions of iron-wire net, weighted with stones and coarse gravel, in facing canals. These have given excellent and cheap protection against erosion in some countries.

Maintenance is also made more costly by failure to provide originally enough canal crossings for livestock and people, as well as places for washing and drinking. Under such conditions canal banks inevitably deteriorate with resulting leaks and the creation of pools of stagnant water. Crossings, which for the most part can be very simple in construction, should be installed near the villages and at points frequented by cattle. Paved fords will generally be best for cattle since they will provide facilities for drinking at the same time. There is also a need to regulate road crossings of small canals and ditches. Such crossings, which are built by the landowners, are often too short and constructed so poorly that considerable water escapes and the approaches to the crossings are reduced to quagmires.

The operation of the irrigation systems, involving the delivery of water to the actual users, could be considerably improved. Fair distribution is undoubtedly made difficult by chronic shortages of water. Whenever water is short, its distribution tends to be hotly disputed. Under such circumstances the influential landowner is often successful in bringing pressure to bear on the poorly-paid irrigation official who is in charge of distribution. Sometimes landowners resort to more direct action by building temporary dams across canals in order to divert more water to their land. Equitable distribution is also impeded by old water rights which are attached to individual land parcels, particularly in the Diyala River Valley, and are transferred with such property. They often confer a right

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when, in 1945, with the formation of the Arab League, the 661
Palestine question became a vital—if not the only—foundation of 563
common purpose in the Arab national movement, the Jewish minority in Iraq inevitably came to be identified with what the feverish minds of the populace had come to regard as a menace to Arab aspirations. Even before the United Nations voted in favour of the establishment of a Jewish State, Jews in Iraq were being accused of the most fantastic crimes and subjected to many restrictions.

In May, 1947, for instance, an Arab newspaper alleged, in spite of an official police denial, that a Jew had given poisoned sweets to an Arab child. In December of the same year another Jew was arrested on suspicion of having placed a tube containing cholera germs in a stream (*Daily Telegraph*, December 29, 1947). From the beginning of 1947 Jews were not allowed to leave the country unless they gave the Government a guarantee in the form of a £2,000 deposit. In the summer of 1947 Muhammad Fadhil Bey al-Jamali, then Iraqi Foreign Minister, stated bluntly to the United Nations Committee on Palestine that "the fate of the Jews in Muslim countries depends on developments in Palestine." The threat materialised when Iraqi troops joined in the invasion of Palestine.

The State of Emergency, which was then declared, was used as a *carte blanche* for all kinds of anti-Jewish measures, largely at the hands of the apparatus of State. Sentences without appeal were passed by courts martial, thus avoiding the necessity of introducing special legislation which might have had to be explained and justified later. As much was openly admitted by the Prime Minister, al-Pachachi Pasha, when he reassured some members of the Opposition (who had expressed their fear of the possible misuse of the Government's emergency powers) that these measures would be applied to Jews only.

The sole attempt to provide the Government with a legal basis for its anti-Jewish policy was an amendment to Article 51 of the Criminal Code. The first paragraph of this amendment enumerates those doctrines whose propagation is punishable in Iraq. In August, 1948, the crime of "Zionism" was added to the list. In fact, however, this legal gesture was quite superfluous, as the system of discrimination against the Jews had long been perfected. The sum of £2,000 deposit, guaranteeing the return of Jews wishing to go abroad, was increased to £3,000 on May 15, 1948; and even then an exit permit, granted only in exceptional cases, was necessary.

Many Jewish officials were arbitrarily dismissed from their posts in the public service, though some of the more senior among them were given the privilege of being either retired on pension or simply suspended from their duties. Even in the prevalent atmosphere of excitement the absurdity of these dismissals was felt. A case in point is that of Ibrahim al-Kebir, the Jewish Controller-General of the Treasury, who was retired on pension only a fortnight after he had been sent to London to negotiate a new financial agreement between Britain and Iraq.

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Finally, following the Israeli victories in Palestine, the Government vented its spleen on the Jews of Iraq by issuing, in October, 1948, a circular instructing all Government departments to dismiss their Jewish employees. In this way most of the Jewish public servants were got rid of without notice, pension, or compensation. Only a small number remained.

It must be said that most reports published in the West about the requisitioning of Jewish buildings in Iraq have been greatly exaggerated. Only two Jewish club-houses were taken over for more than a short time, to be used as shelter for Arab refugees from Palestine. All other requisitioned buildings were eventually returned to their owners.

So far as can be ascertained, the only other anti-Jewish measure taken by the Iraqi Government openly is a decree issued on July 17, 1948, by the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam Pasha, whereby all Jewish-owned banks were forbidden to have any transactions with foreign countries.

So long as legislative anti-Jewish steps were on a comparatively restricted scale, the campaign was left to the police and to military courts. This gave an opportunity to narrow-minded officials and officers to vent their spite on the Jewish community. Police searches of Jewish houses, denunciations, arrests, the application of brutal "third degree" methods to those accused of "Zionist activities" or "endangering the security of the State" were the order of the day. Old letters containing a reference to Palestine, and even the mere mention of that country's name in conversation, were liable to lead to arrest. In one case, a map of the Holy Land attached to a Bible was taken as evidence of "Zionist affiliations."

It goes without saying that these police raids presented a tempting opportunity for blackmail; and not a few officials made good use of it.

On the other hand, this also must be said: thanks to the Government's ban on demonstrations, there were no mob onslaughts on Jewish property. The only evidence of lawless disorder is provided by the practice of small groups of Muslims which, under the pretext of collecting funds for the Palestinian Arab refugees, went from one Jewish shop or house to another, robbing the intimidated and unresisting owners.

But these incidents were insignificant compared with the large-scale campaign of financial extortion carried on by the Government itself. The careful use of trials by court martial provided the authorities with an excellent cloak under which they were able to squeeze the wealthy elements of the Jewish minority as a source of funds wherewith to cover the heavy cost of military adventure in Palestine, an adventure made all the more costly by the fact that it was undertaken at a time when the country's long-standing financial difficulties were particularly acute.

Even a cursory glance at the list of trials is sufficient to make two

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things stand out clearly: first, the absurd vagueness of the indictments; and, second, the Government's determination to make the best possible financial use of the proceedings.

In many cases, the Iraqi press, reporting these trials, did not even find it necessary to state the nature of the crimes of which the accused had been found guilty. Here are two typical examples:

> Hezkiel Zaki has been condemned to two years' imprisonment and fined 500 dinars. (*Al-Shaab*, February 7, 1949.) (1 dinar = £1 sterling.)
>
> Sadik Nahum has been found a danger to the security of the State and fined 3,000 dinars as a guarantee of good conduct (*Liwa al-Istiqlal*, March 14, 1949.)

When mention was made of alleged "offences," their nature is revealing of the prevailing state of affairs. One man was condemned for having made some remarks "against the honour of the army." An accused group were found guilty of having "shown sympathy with the Zionists. . . ." The fact that in many cases the expressions "Zionism" and "Communism" were made to mean the same thing is symptomatic of the flimsiness of these charges.

It is difficult to establish the exact number of cases in which Jews were accused of "Zionist activities" or "Zionist sympathies." In many instances the courts martial had before them Muslims and Christians as well as Jews, jointly charged with "Communist activities." But wherever a Jew was concerned, the sentence invariably included a heavy fine. In the light of this, there can be no doubt that the main duty of the courts martial was to obtain funds for the empty Treasury.

The following are a few examples of typical cases:

> The court martial rules that Shaul Yahya must deposit a guarantee of 200 dinars as it is alleged that he has committed acts which have disturbed public order. (*Saut al-Ahrar*, December 19, 1948.)
>
> R. Sassoon Ghazale and Nissim Rahim must pay 500 dinars guarantee for their good conduct and the maintenance of order, as it is alleged that Nissim Rahim has received a letter from his aunt, Therese Rahim, who is now in Palestine. (*Al-Shaab*, December 30, 1948.)
>
> It is ruled that Ezra Hezkiel and Murad Abraham must each pay 1,000 dinars as a guarantee that they will observe good conduct. (*Al-Shaab*, January 6, 1949.)

And there were many similar cases. The almost invariable stipulation that these fines should be paid to the Ministry of Defence leaves no doubt as to the purpose for which the money was used.

The most vivid example, both of vague indictment and of the Government's financial greed, was the case of the Jewish multi-millionaire, Shafiq Ades, of Basra (the only one of the accused, by the way, who was sentenced to death and hanged in public).

Although his trial was reported and discussed in detail by all the newspapers, it was never clearly established whether there was any connection between his sale of surplus British military equipment to

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Italy in 1946 and the alleged discovery of the same material in Palestine two years later. The proceedings were held mostly behind closed doors, and the court went so far as to refuse the defence counsel admission to the courtroom. Among many other curious details in this trial, this extremely wealthy capitalist was accused both of "Communism" and "Zionism"! The point to note is that Ades's sentence enriched the Government's treasury by £5,000,000.

The day of his execution was turned into a festival. It was declared a public holiday; thousands of people flooded into Basra from the countryside, and photographs depicting every detail of the hanging appeared in all the newspapers.

There is little doubt that the majority of contributions towards the fund raised for the prosecution of the Palestine campaign and, later, for the assistance of Arab refugees, came from Jews. During May and June, 1948, Baghdad radio broadcast a long list of Jewish names and their contributions. According to reliable estimates, these total about 500,000 dinars.

Over and above the swelling of the Iraqi war-chest, most of the methods adopted in the anti-Jewish campaign suggest that generally the Government, with popular support, was actively engaged in extorting as much money as it could from the Jewish community.

Early in July, 1948, for instance, 40 leading Jewish business men were arrested on a charge of trading with the Soviet Union and thus allegedly supporting a Communist régime. It so happens that many Muslim commercial firms had engaged in similar transactions, many of which had taken place several years before. It also happens that these transactions were the direct result of the Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement. But in the case of the 40 Jews these factors were quietly ignored. The true motives for their being charged became quite obvious when it was learnt that all 40 were released on payment of various sums of up to 10,000 dinars.

In October of the same year the Treasury issued an order to the effect that all Iraqi Jews living abroad would forfeit their property unless they returned to Iraq at once.

The total sum which the Government obtained by means of fines, confiscations, "guarantees," and forfeiture of property was certainly a substantial proportion of Jewish-owned wealth in Iraq. It may be computed at something well over £10,000,000. This official draining of Jewish resources, moreover, was accompanied by a great deal of private blackmail, made possible by the helplessness of the victims.

To a Western observer this record might appear proof of systematic persecution. The thinly disguised extortions from the Jewish community, the arbitrary, and often stupid accusations, the onslaught on a helpless minority whose loyalty could not reasonably be questioned —all this would appear at first glance as something more than an attempt to make certain of public security in an emergency; the record seems to bear all the signs of deeply-rooted anti-Jewish hostility. But

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if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the excellence of the relations between the communities but a few years ago and the obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish population as an integral part of the nation?

The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind. There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a description of the subtle blend of human passions, age-old habits, and deep-seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought has reacted to the impact of Western civilisation, with its conception of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to certain points.

To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from the First World War represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self-conscious and self-centred city populations, rival clans, powerful landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the allegiance of the majority to Islam.

The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.

In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a wave of feeling against its very creator and helper—Britain. And when King Faisal, whose great ability and authority had succeeded in surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the Government was intensified, thereby adding a new element of insecurity.

Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on, began competing with each other for the favours of extremist parties, and contributed to making every change of Government an event of greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in April, 1941, was merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the middle of a world war.

This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of £1,334,733, despite the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948, imports exceeded exports by £17,000,000, while the country's whole foreign trade amounted to only £27,000,000. Hence the prevailing nervousness